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Abstract. In most political systems, the community of policy insiders represents a small subset of the total 
interest group population. Therefore, one key question is which factors explain why some mobilized interests 
become insiders and others remain outsiders. By contrasting a bottom-up registration of interest groups with a 
top-down census of all groups that enjoy access to policymakers, we present a unique approach to distinguish 
insiders from outsiders. This approach allows us to systematically analyse which factors – such as resources, 
constituency, scale of organization and policy portfolio – predict who becomes a policy insider. Our analysis 
focuses on interest group politics in Belgium, and shows that next to resources, the size of the membership, the 
scale of organization and a group’s policy portfolio are strong predictors of the likelihood to gain access.  
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Introduction 
 
The interaction between organized interests and policymakers represents a key component of 
contemporary democracies, which often have established extensive participatory systems, 
such as consultation arrangements or advisory bodies. Such venues play a crucial role in 
transmitting societal concerns, political knowledge and policy expertise from organized 
interests to government officials. Although ideally these systems of interest intermediation 
should ensure that no societal segment is systematically over- or underrepresented, it is well 
established that considerable inequalities exist in the extent to which different sections of 
society get organized and gain access to policymakers. A repeatedly heard conclusion is that 
interest representation tends to be biased towards a few selective interests, and that most 
interest group communities are skewed towards well-endowed constituencies, in particular 
economic interests (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Lowery and Gray, 2004; Schattschneider, 
1960; Schlozman et al., 2012). Therefore, a fundamental political science question concerns 
in what way organized interests that gain access, the so-called policy insiders, are different 
from policy outsiders, those that do not enjoy such privileges.  
Interest group scholars have spent much effort characterizing systems of interest 
intermediation, distinguishing groups who enjoy access from those who are bound to stand on 
the sideline. Yet, most studies examining national patterns of interest representation have 
focused on systems that are pluralist in nature, in particular the United States or the United 
Kingdom. We have relatively less knowledge on how these processes unfold in neo-
corporatist continental European systems (but see Binderkrantz, 2008; Christiansen et al. 
2010; Christiansen, 2012). Moreover, not much research has been conducted on how 
institutional multilayeredness shapes interest representation; most work on this topic has 
focused on the activities of EU-level interest groups or examined the Europeanization of 
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national groups (Constantelos, 2004; Eising, 2006; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008). The existing 
research on the Europeanization of interest groups is primarily interested in how the transfer 
of policy competencies to the supranational level has affected organizational strategies, 
promoted “extensions and modifications of established practices” and affected access 
opportunities (Eising, 2006, p. 180). The implications of the downward transfer of policy 
competences to sub-state or regional jurisdictions have generated much less attention, despite 
the fact that these institutional changes may also have fundamental implications for domestic 
systems of interest representation (Keating, 2008, p. 74; but see Celis et al., 2013; Keating 
and Wilson 2014). Therefore, we know little about how multilayeredness shapes the 
composition of interest group communities or affects who gains access and becomes an 
insider. 
A special focus on a devolved country may shed more light on these issues. This 
article therefore looks at Belgium, and more in particular one of its regions, Flanders. 
Analyzing one region within a federal country enables us assess the extent to which a 
subnational community of policy insiders reflects the overall population of mobilized 
interests, taking into account important contextual aspects such as the multilayered nature of 
the country’s political institutions, as well as the corporatist and consociational legacies that 
characterize its system of interest representation. The next section elaborates the conceptual 
implications of this research problem and demonstrates its broader relevance. Next, we 
present a set of hypotheses on the relation between interest group features and government 
access, focusing on an organization’s perceived legitimacy and its capacity to provide policy 
advice, yet also the scale of representation and a group’s policy portfolio. After having 
clarified our research design that combines a bottom-up registration of interest groups with a 
top-down census of all groups that are represented in the government’s advisory system, we 
present our descriptive and multivariate data-analyses and discuss how mobilization patterns 
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of societal interests translate in access to policymaking processes. Our results suggest that 
although organizational resources clearly matter, the size of a group’s membership, its scale 
of organization and the policy domains it focuses on are strong predictors of the likelihood to 
gain access. In the concluding section, the broader implications of these findings are 
discussed.  
 
Interest Group Mobilization and Access 
 
While many organized interests may mobilize, only a minority enjoys government access. 
Although transaction costs will play their part, as policymakers due to limited resources 
cannot interact with all relevant interest groups, we expect that the interactions between 
policymakers and societal interests will also be substantially shaped by the institutional nature 
of an interest group system. In this regard, one traditionally distinguishes corporatist and 
pluralist polities (Almond, 1983; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 
1979). This distinction refers to variation involving “the extent of state autonomy, the degree 
of societal organization, the variety, legitimacy and degree of interest group participation” 
(Eising, 2008, p. 1169; see also Dür and Mateo 2012). A pluralist system is generally 
characterized by a fragmented and diverse organizational landscape, where the community of 
policy participants is largely shaped by competition among a diverse array of organized 
interests. In contrast, a corporatist system traditionally has an extensive institutionalization of 
state-society interactions resulting in a more top-down and hierarchical structure of interest 
representation. In such systems, umbrella associations enjoy privileged relations with public 
authorities, which take “a leading role in orchestrating interest group participation in the 
policy process” (Granados and Knoke, 2005, p. 293). Here, public authorities often grant 
privileged access to a limited number of mostly socio-economic interests, and may also 
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develop “restrictive NGO regulations as a means to preserve consensus and well-developed 
formal procedures for collaboration” (Bloodgood et al., 2014, p. 720). For these reasons, one 
can expect that newcomers generally face greater difficulties to mobilize and gain access in 
neo-corporatist systems.  
 The country we focus on, Belgium, is usually conceived ‘moderately neo-corporatist’, 
as it is quite similar to Germany and Denmark, but less neo-corporatist than Austria and 
Norway (Bloodgood et al, 2013; Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991; Siaroff, 1999). The neo-
corporatist mode of policymaking is not limited to economic affairs and also characterizes 
policymaking in other sectors such as education and health care. However, besides its neo-
corporatist feature, interest group mobilization in Belgium is also strongly affected by its 
consociational legacy and federal nature. Consociationalism here implies pillarization, 
referring to strong and dense networks among organizations from the same subcultures, the 
latter build on religious, ideological and economic cleavages (Deschouwer, 2009; Beyers et 
al. 2014). Next, several of the so-called new social movements and NGOs that emerged in the 
sixties, focusing on issues ranging from environmental protection to development cooperation 
and consumer rights, have over time developed into well-established organizations. In sum, as 
in many other neo-corporatist countries, interest representation in Belgium cannot be limited 
to traditional labor and business organizations. This observation provides us with an 
interesting paradox. Whereas neo-corporatism generally constrains the number of mobilized 
organized interests and tends to centralize access, other characteristics of Belgium (such as its 
multilayeredness and consociational legacy) may result in rather crowded, diverse and 
fragmented interest group system.  
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Explaining Who’s In and Who’s Out: Hypotheses 
 
In multilayered federal systems, a significant proportion of the interest group population gets 
mobilized at the regional level. As a result, the increase in the size and scope of mobilized 
interest groups that has been observed in most political systems during the past decades 
(Halpin and Jordan, 2012), can be expected to be even more pronounced in federal systems. 
The growing demand for access entails a challenge for policymakers; as their time and 
resources are constrained, they cannot grant access to every individual interest group 
Therefore, the supply of access by policymakers inevitably has some exclusionary effects. 
While some groups enjoy close ties with policymakers – the insiders –, the great majority of 
organized interests will remain outsiders. Our main goal is to analyze how groups that enjoy 
access differ from those that have no formal ties to public authorities. Often, the interactions 
between policymakers and organized interests are conceived as an exchange relation 
(Bouwen, 2002; Braun, 2012; Eising, 2007; see also Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). While strategic considerations will play their part in these interactions, 
various authors have argued that the insider-position of a group will largely be shaped by its 
status in the eyes of policymakers, which is generally linked to a groups’ overall potential to 
provide valuable resources, in particular policy expertise and societal legitimacy (Maloney et 
al., 1994; see also Grossmann, 2012). As argued by Grossmann, “policymakers rely on basic 
signals about organizations that allow them to make comments like ‘they have credibility’ and 
‘they’re known players’, without fully processing how they arrived at these judgments” 
(2012, p. 165). Here, various organizational features provide cues on the basis of which 
policymakers determine who is most valuable in terms of policy knowhow or societal support.  
Furthermore, in order to understand interactions between organized interest and 
policymakers in a multilevel system, two more organizational features should be taken into 
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account. First, the scale of organization, the extent to which an interest group represents a 
regional or a nation-wide constituency, could be an important factor to explain access at 
different levels. Second, we should also consider the division of policy responsibilities within 
a multilayered system. That is, the fact that some domains are an exclusive regional 
competence whereas others are shared with the central government, may greatly affect the 
mobilization of organized interest and their policy engagement at different levels of 
government. Below, we develop a more detailed account of these hypotheses linked to three 
factors: a group’s perceived legitimacy, its ability to provide policy expertise, and how a 
group is tied to a regional constituency or regional policy competencies.  
 
First, we consider organizational features related to a group’s legitimacy or the amount 
and type of political support an organization can mobilize. Generally, one can presume that 
government officials are primarily interested in organizations that are capable to speak on 
behalf of a substantial membership, which can be signaled through an umbrella structure, 
implying that a group’s members are associations of organizations (H1) and/or a large amount 
of members (H2). Furthermore, some types of organized interests might enjoy more 
credibility with policymakers. Especially in a neo-corporatist system, economic groups, such 
as labor unions and business interests who as employers and employees often have a specific 
stake in policymaking, are quite likely to be regarded as legitimate interlocutors (H3). In 
addition, the age of a group might be an important factor. Hannan and Freeman for instance 
argue that “old organizations tend to develop dense webs of exchange, to affiliate with centers 
of power, and to acquire an aura of inevitability” (1989, p. 81). Likewise, it can be expected 
that older organizations have a better understanding of policymaking processes (Furlong, 
1997, p. 329). Therefore, policymakers might be tempted to ascribe more legitimacy to older 
organizations, compared to groups that have only been in existence for a few years (H4). One 
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other relevant feature concerns whether an interest group has a centralized or decentralized 
structure, the latter implying that groups not only have a national office, but also established 
grass-roots chapters at the provincial or local level. A decentralized organizational form is 
believed to promote citizenship and the build-up of social capital by linking nation-wide and 
regional associations to their local roots (Skocpol, 2003). Yet, the effect on access is less 
obvious. While it could be that decentralized groups are more focused on providing 
membership services, we expect that a decentralized structure positively affects access, as it 
signals an organization’s local embeddedness and might also provide some informational 
advantages (H5). Moreover, having local antennas is especially relevant in a proportional 
electoral system with relatively small electoral districts, which is the case in Belgium 
(Deschouwer, 2009). As interest groups with local branches have closer connections to voters, 
they could be particularly relevant to politicians.  
 
Next, we consider organizational features that relate to an interest group’s policy 
capacity, or its ability to provide expertise to policymakers. An evident indicator involves the 
amount of staff employed by an organization. Human resources are critical to effective 
advocacy, as they enable organizations to survive, monitor political processes, develop 
specialized expertise, network and set up campaigns to attract new supporters and members 
(Klüver, 2012; Klüver and Saurugger, 2013). In this article, we use the amount of full-time 
equivalent employed as a proxy for an organization’s capacity in terms of financial resources, 
which we consider indicative of a group’s potential to provide policy expertise (H6).  
Still, to understand Belgium’s system of interest representation, one needs to consider 
the broader consociational context, of which “the basic practices are power sharing between 
the elites of the segments and segmental autonomy” (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 4). This 
consociationalism usually goes hand in hand with a strong associational culture and dense 
9 
 
networks of intermediary organizations that belong to the same subculture, also called pillars, 
who frequently provide state-sponsored services to their members(e.g. in the area of health 
and education). Consequently, there usually is not one single umbrella organization that 
dominates interest representation in one particular field, but rather multiple peak 
organizations that compete for attention.1 In the past, many of these so-called collateral 
organizations had strong ties with the three traditional political parties (, the Christian-
democrats, the liberals and the social-democrats) on which they were quite dependent (and 
vice versa) (Kitschelt, 2004). Although these pillar organizations generally benefited from the 
development of the welfare state, pillarization (in terms of societal segmentation) is believed 
to have reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s (Deschouwer, 2009; Huyse, 2003). 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that relations between these organizations and the traditional 
political parties have weakened, their past affiliation may reverberate in contemporary 
policymaking (for instance through overlapping memberships, see van Haute et al., 2013; Van 
Maele, 2009) and result in higher chances of gaining access. While it might be less prevalent 
in newer domains, such as environmental affairs where more recently established organized 
interests often opted to act independently from the pillars, in more traditional fields – such as 
health, labor market or social security – pillar organizations still play a considerable role in 
policymaking and implementation (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 193). Their former affiliation with 
central political parties and current involvement in policy implementation is likely to increase 
their ability to supply valuable information to policymakers (H7).  
 
 Our last three hypotheses relate to how a multilayered setting shapes the organization 
and representation of organized interest. In various European countries, including Belgium, 
devolutionary processes have resulted in a decentralization of competencies away from the 
central state to subnational jurisdictions (Hooghe et al., 2010). As a result, these jurisdictions 
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now have substantial powers in many domains, such as agriculture, education, research and 
environmental affairs. This institutional setting presents a challenge to organized interests, as 
some adjustments might be needed in order to cope with a changed division of policy 
responsibilities. National groups might dissolve into distinct regional organizations or 
establish regional branches, while also new organizations could mobilize at the subnational 
level. Consequently, multilayeredness might lead to a multiplication of interest groups and a 
fragmentation of policy communities, since each government level (with its distinct 
competences) functions as a potential niche within which specialized groups can survive. 
Furthermore, policymakers in a multilevel setting could also have particular demands and 
preferences regarding the organizational features of interest groups. As sub-state governments 
first and foremost need political intelligence and policy expertise on matters that have a 
subnational character (such as the preferences of its constituency, or the implications of a 
particular initiative on regional employment), these will prefer to interact with interests that 
primarily represent a regional constituency (H8).  
Likewise, we should consider the policy portfolio of an interest organization, i.e. the 
domain on which the group focuses its attention and resources. We hypothesize that the type 
of policies an interest group seeks to monitor and influence also shapes the likelihood of 
gaining access. Taking into account the division of policy responsibilities between the central 
and the regional level, we expect that organized interests which focus on domains that relate 
to (quasi)-exclusive regional competencies more easily gain attention from policymakers and 
therefore enjoy more access (H9). Still, this does not imply that the subnational level is the 
exclusive playground of groups with a regional constituency, as organizations with a nation-
wide membership might also have a stake in regional policies. One of the complications here 
is that, even in a dual federation such as Belgium, policy domains cannot easily be separated 
as watertight compartments belonging the regional or the federal level (Swenden, 2004). 
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While some areas, such as agriculture and education, are fully delegated to the subnational 
level, in other domains, such as health and economic affairs, competencies are shared between 
the federal and the regional level. In such areas, we expect to observe both regional and 
nation-wide groups gaining access, although the latter might be less prominent. 
 
To summarize, an overview of our nine hypotheses is presented: 
H1: Umbrella organizations are more likely to enjoy access.  
H2: Groups with a high amount of members are more likely to enjoy  
access. 
H3: Economic interests (business groups and labor unions) are more likely to enjoy 
access.  
H4: Older organized interests are more likely to enjoy access.  
H5: Organized interests with a decentralized structure are more likely to enjoy access. 
H6: Organized interests with a high amount of staff are more likely to enjoy access 
H7: Components of the pillars are more likely to enjoy access 
H8: Organized interests mobilizing a regional constituency are more likely to enjoy 
access at that level. 
H9: Organized interests specializing in policies that are exclusive regional 
responsibility are more likely to enjoy access at that level. 
 
Research Design: Data and Measures 
 
The label organized interests is frequently used to refer to a broad array of organizations, such 
as labor unions, professional interests, public interest groups and social movement 
organizations (Andrews and Edwards, 2004; for a discussion see Halpin, 2010, p. 30-56). In 
addition, different types of institutions are often included, such as corporations, universities, 
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hospitals and local governments (Salisbury, 1983). In this article, a more narrow approach 
will be applied, defining interest organizations as ‘policy-dedicated membership 
organizations’ (Halpin and Jordan, 2012, p. 12). Consequently, these organizations are 
collective in nature, relying either on a formal membership structure or representing a more 
informal constituency consisting of (a mixture of) supporters, activists or donors. 
Furthermore, seeking political influence represents one of their main objectives. They are not 
part of the state, nor do they compete in elections (distinguishing them from political parties). 
This definition excludes public and private institutions, such as local governments and firms. 
Our analyses will be restricted to these constituency based organizations, as this enables us to 
assess the impact of central organizational features (such as the amount of resources, the 
amount of members or the type of members) within a set of organizations that have more or 
less equivalent structures and representational objectives. 
We focus on the population of organized interests in one of Belgium’s regions, 
Flanders, which as a devolved region enjoys considerable autonomy in various domains. It is 
important to clarify that we conceive the Flemish interest group population as consisting of 
both nation-wide (read Belgian) and regional (read Flemish) groups. The Belgian federation 
can be characterized as a dual system, which implies the absence of a hierarchy of legal 
norms. As a result, the regional parliaments and governments stand on equal footing with the 
federal political institutions. The high degree of self-rule in a wide range of domains implies 
that the Flemish government also intervenes in areas that are possibly of interest to nation-
wide interest groups. Moreover, many nation-wide interest groups were established before the 
Belgian regions started to gain self-rule and have maintained their national structure. 
Although nation-wide groups often established regional branches, many of these are still 
organized at the Belgian scale.  
When analyzing the differences between interests that enjoy access and those that are 
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bound to stand on the sideline, many scholars have relied on top-down analyses of groups that 
take part in ongoing policymaking processes, and consequently predominantly covered 
organized interests that demonstrate a rather high level of political activity (Binderkrantz, 
2005; Eising, 2007). Such research designs tend to ignore organized interests that are less well 
integrated in political circles. As a result, the literature offers few systematic accounts of what 
it takes for a mobilized group to gain access and become an insider. In order to draw 
conclusions regarding the representation of various interests, we need evidence on how 
mobilization patterns of societal interests translate in actual access. In other words, if we seek 
to examine why some organized interests are more successful in gaining access, the full set of 
organized interests needs to be considered, including organizations characterized by a high 
level of political activity, as well as those that possibly demonstrate lower levels of political 
activity. For this purpose, our design combines a bottom-up registration of interest groups 
(which includes groups that are possibly less well integrated in political circles) with a top-
down census of all interests that gain access to the Flemish advisory system. This approach 
allows us to analyze the extent to which the distribution of mobilized interests in the 
population is reproduced by policymakers when they select groups for policy advice and to 
identify factors that explain the distinction between insiders and outsiders.  
 Our bottom-up census of the interest population in Flanders relies on the Crossroads 
Bank for Enterprises (CBE, Kruispuntbank van Ondernemingen) that is maintained by the 
Federal Public Service Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy (FPS Economy, 
Federale Overheidsdienst Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie). The CBE includes 
all entities that engage in economic activities in Belgium, and is connected to different other 
databanks, such as National Bank of Belgium. From this register, we selected all non-profits 
that had been assigned the NACE code S94, which refers to organizations that represent the 
interests and views of specific constituencies.2 Category S94 includes business, employers 
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and professional membership organizations, yet also other membership organizations, such as 
environmental and development NGOs. We also include mutuals, or health insurance 
associations, that are organized on a nation-wide basis. While these organizations have been 
assigned a different code in the NACE system, they fit our definition, as they have individual 
members whose interests they claim to represent. Similar to other organizations such as labor 
unions, they are subsidized by the state in return for executing specific tasks, in their case the 
reimbursement of medical expenses.3 After excluding political parties and religious orders 
(such as abbeys, dioceses and other mostly local religious institutions), as well as associations 
that focus predominantly on the international (for instance European or international umbrella 
organizations), local level or the Francophone community of Belgium, our population 
encompasses 1013 nation-wide and Flemish interest organizations. As we mentioned above, 
we focus exclusively on constituency-based groups (with and without a formal membership 
structure), which represent 729 of the 1013 identified organizations (72 percent) of the 
interest organizations in the population. 
In order to identify the Flemish policy insiders, we consider membership of the 
Strategic Advisory Councils (SACs) as a proxy for access.4 These advisory bodies represent 
the main consultative arrangements in Flanders and play an important role in several phases 
of the policy cycle (Popelier et a.l, 2012). They are considered a central component of the 
Flemish administration and a crucial instrument to ‘keep a finger on the pulse of civil society’ 
(Bourgeois, 2009). Representation in the SACs can thus be conceived as an important 
institutionalized form of access. While these venues enable public authorities to structure their 
relations with organized interests, they also offer the latter an opportunity to gain political 
attention, exercise influence and build networks with different policymakers and other 
organized interests. This set, which includes 352 organizations, comprises a number of 
cultural and educational institutions (n=19; for instance universities), firms (n=65, frequently 
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appointed by business associations) and governmental actors (n=74, mostly cities and 
provinces, but also operational elements of government, such as harbors, airports and public 
agencies); these organizations do not claim to represent a particular constituency. Still, most 
consulted organizations (n=194 or 55 percent) represent a (formal or informal) membership or 
constituency and encompass both national (n=51) and subnational (n=143) groups.  
 Subsequently, all data was coded using an adjusted version of the codebook developed 
by Hanegraaff et al. (2011), consulting information available on organizational websites, 
annual accounts or publicly available reports. For each identified actor, we coded variables 
related to the organization type (such as whether it involves an economic group, 
encompassing labor unions and business associations), a (formerly) pillarized association 
(which implies that their (former) name or mission refers to one of the main political 
ideologies), its structure (umbrella organization, membership type, amount of members, scale 
of organization), issue focus, as well as age and resources (in terms of staff size). Regarding 
the “scale of organization”, we coded 1 if the organization focuses on a constituency 
exclusively located in Flanders and 0 if the organization represents a constituency 
encompassing the Belgian territory (including both the Francophone community and the 
Flemish region). Concerning issue focus, our coding is based on a website coding of the 
domains in which an organization is active and consists of three categories: 1) domains in 
which the Flemish region has exclusive competence (e.g. education, transport, culture and 
environmental affairs), 2) shared competences, implying that policy responsibilities are shared 
with the federal government and, 3) domains where the federal government has full authority. 
As indicative of the organizational resources, we use the number of full-time equivalents 
employed by an interest organization, distinguishing between organizations with a low (1-4), 
medium (5-19) and high (≥20) amount of staff.  
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Finally, our measurement of the membership variables needs some clarification. There 
are two problems with raw membership counts, which justify a transformation of this variable 
(see Table 1). First, such membership counts are incomparable across different organization 
types; a business or institutional organization with 500 members (firms or institutions) could 
be large and pretty encompassing, while 500 individuals is a rather small membership for a 
group with individual members. Second, the distribution of membership densities is severely 
non-linear, with a number of organizations that have huge membership numbers (for groups 
with individuals this distribution ranges from 29 individuals to 4.5 million; the range is 3 to 
25.000 for groups with an institutional membership). This makes that, although we have one 
count, this count represents different metrics for different organization types and, therefore, it 
does not reflect what a ‘low’ membership density means within the context of a specific 
organization type. Clearly, one cannot simply compare the counts of institutional 
memberships with counts of individual memberships, or with the number of associations that 
are member of a particular interest organization (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Distribution of membership numbers for different membership types 
 N mean std. skewness min max 
Individual membership 
 
132  
(93 missing) 
123 602 507 387 6.75 29 4 500 000 
Institutional membership 
 
213 
(69 missing) 
1012 3116 4.87 3 25 000 
Association of organizations 95 
(19 missing) 
89 243 4.96 2 1 800 
Index: 108 organizations are not included in this table as they represent a more informal constituency consisting of (a mixture of) supporters, 
activists or donors. 
 
We addressed this problem by testing multiple models for which we developed distinct 
explanatory factors. To begin with, we model the impact of membership type by 
distinguishing whether groups 1) have no formal members, 2) have formal members that are 
individuals, 3) have formal members that are corporate entities or institutions, and 4) have 
other organizations as member. Next, we log-transformed the membership counts (in order to 
cope with its non-linear nature) and then established standardized z-scores separately for each 
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distinct membership type (to get a comparable metric which discounts for the role 
membership types plays in generating incomparable counts). Finally, we created a categorical 
variable that compares groups without an informal constituency with three sets of equal sized 
categories distinguishing groups with a low, medium and high amount of members taking 
account of the distributions within membership type.  
 
Data Analyses 
 
Before carrying out a multivariate test, we provide a descriptive account of the different 
organization types within the Flemish interest group population and compare this with 
organizations that enjoy access to advisory bodies. Here, we pay particular attention to the 
territorial scale of organization (nation-wide or regional; see Table 2). Among these interest 
groups, we have a highly diverse set of actors including institutional groups such as 
associations of hospitals and schools (n=49, 6 percent), citizen groups including for instance 
patient groups, environmental and development organizations (n=301, 41 percent), labor 
unions (n=27, 4 percent), and business associations (n=351, 49 percent), the latter two 
including sector-specific and multi-industry associations. More than half of the mobilized 
population (53 percent) thus consists of economic interests, namely business associations and 
labor groups. If we focus on the scale of organization, that is, do these organizations mobilize 
or represent a nation-wide (Belgian) or a regional (Flemish) constituency, we notice that a 
majority of the organizations in the population are nation-wide groups (n=430 or 59 percent), 
meaning that they represent a constituency situated in the different Belgian regions. However, 
the picture changes when we consider organization types. Whereas 3 out of 4 business and 
labor groups operate at a Belgium scale, institutional and especially citizen groups mostly 
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mobilize Flemish constituencies (respectively 37 and 44 percent of these groups operates at a 
Belgian scale).  
 
Table 2. Organization type and scale of organization in the population and advisory 
bodies (frequencies and percentages) 
 Population  
(n=729; Chi2=72.25, p<.0001, df=3, Cramèr’s V=.31) 
Advisory bodies 
(n=118; Chi2=22.16, p<.0001, df=3, Cramèr’s V=.43) 
Organization type Nation-wide Regional Total (%) Nation-wide Regional Total (%) 
Institutional group 18 (3%) 31 (4%) 49 (7%) 0 (0%) 13 (11%) 13 (11%) 
Citizen group 133 (18%) 169 (23%) 302 (41%) 12 (10%) 35 (30%) 47 (40%) 
Business group 259 (35%) 92 (13%) 351 (48%) 20 (17%) 22 (19%) 42 (36%) 
Labour group 20 (3%) 7 (1%) 27 (4%) 12 (10%) 4 (3%) 16 (13%) 
Total 430 (59%) 299 (41%) 729 (100%) 44 (37%) 74 (63%) 118 (100%) 
 
 
The next three columns compare the population distribution with the distribution 
among the policy insiders. Of the 729 organizations in the population, 118 (or 16 percent) are 
policy insiders, meaning that they enjoy access to at least one of the Flemish SACs (or one of 
the various sub-councils). Regarding different organization types, we notice that about half of 
the organized interests in the advisory bodies are labor unions and business associations. 
However, while the proportion of business interests in the advisory bodies is 13 percent lower 
than their share in the population, the representation of labor unions in the community of 
insiders is 9 percent higher than their share in the population. Hence, although we expected 
that all economic interests would be privileged in a neo-corporatist policy, it appears that the 
advisory system is particularly beneficial to labor unions, as they are pretty successful in 
becoming policy insiders. Yet, this could also refer to the more heterogeneous nature of the 
category business associations, which encompasses a great variety of groups, ranging from 
generalist associations with mostly regional companies to very specialized industry 
associations or professional groups. This heterogeneity might follow from a larger capacity to 
establish more specialized associations compared to labor unions, whose resources are more 
limited and therefore are more likely to organize through more generalist organizational forms 
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(Traxler, 1993, p. 687). If we consider the level of mobilization, our observations appear to 
corroborate the hypothesis that organizations representing a regional constituency have a 
considerable higher chance to gain access to advisory bodies (compared to nation-wide 
organizations). With the notable exception of labor unions, a majority of citizen and 
institutional interests in the community of policy insiders consists of Flemish organizations. 
With respect to business groups, both national and regional groups are more or less evenly 
represented. 
Given the fact that we have a dichotomous dependent variable, we run a logistic 
regression analyses for the multivariate analysis, making a distinction between insiders (1) 
and outsiders (0). Our parameter estimates express the likelihood of an organization to gain 
access, given a particular organizational feature, and keeping other variables constant. One of 
the challenges we faced in coding the organizations in our population is that some basic 
information, in particular membership data, was sometimes difficult to come across. While we 
have data for most variables, we were only able to retrieve membership data for 75 percent of 
the organizations. Therefore, we test different models with distinct membership-related 
variables. The results are presented in Table 3; the discussion below relies on expected 
probabilities as generated by Model IV.5  
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Table 3. Predicting the probability of gaining access, logistic regression analysis 
Independent Variables Model I: ignoring membership 
data 
Model II: membership type Model III: transformed 
membership variable  
(omitted groups with an 
informal constituency) 
Model IV: categorizing 
membership variable 
Intercept -4.32 (0.63)*** -4.70 (0.69)*** -3.40 (0.72)*** -4.71 (0.74)*** 
Umbrella organization 0.57 (0.29) †    0.32 (0.32) 0.33 (0.32) 
Membership type (H1) 
4 = associations of organizations 
3 = institutional members 
2 = individual members 
1 = informal constituency (ref category) 
  
1.01 (0.48)* 
0.96 (0.50) † 
0.21 (0.48) 
- 
  
Membership transformed (H2)   0.48 (0.15)**  
Membership categorized (H2) 
4 = high membership 
3 = medium membership 
2 = low  
1 = informal constituency (ref category) 
    
1.28 (0.50)* 
1.09 (0.51)*  
0.56 (0.52) 
- 
Organization Type (H3) 
1 = economic group (business-labor) 
0 = otherwise 
 
0.77 (0.26)** 
- 
 
0.44 (0.30)  
- 
 
0.46 (0.31)  
- 
 
0.42 (0.31) 
- 
Age (H4) 
Organizational age in years (logged) 
 
0.02 (0.15) 
 
0.01 (0.15) 
 
-0.03 (0.17) 
 
0.08 (0.16) 
Decentralized (H5) 
1 = decentralized 
0 = centralized 
 
0.20 (0.27) 
- 
 
0.31 (0.28) 
- 
 
-0.14 (0.32) 
- 
 
0.02 (0.30) 
Staff resources (H6) 
3 = high (≥ 20) 
2 = medium (5-19) 
1= low (ref category) (≤ 4) 
 
2.35 (0.36)*** 
1.56 (0.29)*** 
- 
 
2.40 (0.36)*** 
1.57 (0.29)*** 
- 
 
1.91 (0.42)*** 
1.34 (0.32)*** 
- 
 
2.10 (0.39)*** 
1.39 (0.31)*** 
- 
Pillarized (H7) 
1= pillarized 
0= not pillarized 
 
1.19 (0.36)** 
- 
 
1.30 (0.38)** 
- 
 
0.95 (0.45)* 
- 
 
1.16 (0.43)** 
Organization Scale (H8) 
1 = regional constituency 
0 = ration-wide constituency 
 
1.12 (0.26)*** 
- 
 
1.08 (0.28)*** 
- 
 
1.34 (0.31)*** 
- 
 
1.18 (0.29)*** 
- 
Policy portfolio (H9) 
1 = exclusive regional competence 
0 = shared or exclusively federal 
 
1.10 (0.28)*** 
- 
 
1.09 (0.28)*** 
- 
 
1.18 (0.34)*** 
- 
 
1.13 (0.31)*** 
- 
-2LogL (Null Model=637.630) 480.740 474.135 358.518 409.826 
Df 9 11 10 12 
Nagelkerke R Square .25 .26 .26 .26 
N 707 707 433 540 
Index: parameter estimates (standard errors between brackets); *** = <.001; ** = <.01; * = <.05; †  = <.1 
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Based on these analyses, three of our hypotheses need to be rejected. An 
organization’s degree of decentralization does not have any effect, nor does its age. Although 
a decentralized organization has an average probability of 0.37 of gaining a seat, while 
centralized organizations have a likelihood of 0.15, this difference cannot be considered as 
statistically significant (partially because of considerable variation among the decentralized 
groups, σ=0.44). Interestingly, we did not observe a significant difference for different age 
cohorts. While it is often assumed that it takes time to build a reputation and establish ties 
with policymakers, the Flemish advisory system does not privilege older groups. Furthermore, 
being an umbrella organization (or having an organizational membership) has a small, but not 
highly significant (p= <.1) impact on the chance of becoming an insider and the effect of this 
variable evaporates in Model III and IV.  
Furthermore, in terms of representativeness, the size of the membership generates a 
stronger explanatory impact than organizational structure. Model II tests whether membership 
type matters and shows that associations of organizations, and to a lesser extent groups with 
instititutional members, have a higher chance of gaining access compared to groups with 
individual members or an informal constituency (which is in line with Model I, which 
suggests that umbrella associations have slightly more access). Yet, the impact of membership 
size appears to be much more significant and robust, as shown by both Model III and IV. 
Groups with a high and medium amount of members (average expected probability of 
respectively 0.38 and 0.21) are much more likely to gain access compared to those with a 
lower membership density (average expected probability 0.13). Moreover, the same models 
demonstrate that a formal membership structure which involves many members is more 
helpful than representing a more informal constituency (see Model IV); the average expected 
probability of gaining access for the latter category is only 0.07. Importantly, while peak and 
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especially economic groups have a higher chance of gaining access (Model I), the effect of 
peak associations and being an economic groups disappears entirely and when controlling for 
membership variables (Model II, III and IV). Hence, for gaining access, membership 
variables – in particular the size of the formal membership – are more important than whether 
an organization is a peak association or represents economic interests.  
As hypothesized, an organization’s degree of professionalization (measured as full-
time equivalents employed) has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of becoming an 
insider. While the average expected probability to gain access is 0.21, this probability is on 
average 0.08 of organizations with 4 or less than 4 staff members. In contrast, organizations 
that have between five and nineteen staff members have an average likelihood of gaining 
access of 0.28, whereas those organizations that employ more than twenty people have an 
average likelihood of 0.51. Furthermore, organized interests that represent a Flemish 
constituency have a much better chance of gaining representation (0.33 compared to 0.13 for 
those representing a nation-wide constituency). Similarly, organizations that focus on a 
domain which is an exclusive regional competence, such as education, agriculture or 
environment, have a much higher chance to gain access (average expected probability of 0.34) 
compared those who focus on shared or federal competencies (average expected probability 
of .18).  
Another way to illustrate the importance of how policy competencies are divided or 
shared is by comparing various policy fields in more detail. Figure 1 plots the share of 
organizations in the population which focus on a particular domain, with the observed 
proportion of organizations within a field that gain access, and the expected probability within 
these domains to gain access. It is also relevant to look at the extent to which a field is an 
exclusively regional competence, or rather a shared or federal policy responsibility. For 
instance, agriculture and fisheries, education, cultural policy, environment and transport are 
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exclusive or largely regional competencies. In contrast, development cooperation and most 
rights-based policies (such as anti-discrimination policies, human rights, justice and criminal 
policies) are largely central government competencies. Other fields are more difficult to 
classify. For instance, while social security and health insurance are federal competencies, the 
organization of residential health care is a regional competence. Therefore, these fields can be 
seen as shared competences, implying that policy responsibilities are shared between the 
central and the subnational governments.  
 
Figure 1. Comparing the observed share in the population with observed insiderness 
(proportion of access) and the predicted probability to become an insider (Model IV) 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the likelihood of access is rather high for associations representing 
interests related to education (55 percent) and transport (35 percent)). For other domains, the 
observed proportion is lower than 25 percent. Consequently, it appears that organized 
interests that are active in fields that are an exclusive Flemish competence (such as culture, 
education, transport, environment and agriculture) have a high chance of gaining access 
(compared to their prevalence in the population). Apparently, there appears to be a mismatch 
between the share of a field in the population and the chance that groups within that field gain 
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access to a Flemish advisory body. For instance, transport and education have a relative low 
share in the population, while the probability that these groups gain access is pretty high. In 
contrast, some fields represent a considerable share in the interest group population (e.g. 
health and welfare and the service sector), while organizations representing these fields enjoy 
rather low levels of access (observed and expected) to the advisory system. Next to the 
organizations that focus on a particular field, we observe that peak business and especially 
labor associations – whose interests encompass both regional and central state competencies – 
enjoy a high level of access, despite the fact that these organizations exist in low numbers.  
Taking this into account, devolution in Belgium has resulted in the emergence of a 
subnational interest group community. While this logically follows from the division of 
competencies in a federation, it remains a significant finding, as in many domains 
competencies are still shared between the regional and federal government level. Yet, even in 
these domains, a regional interest community is emerging, providing support for the 
expectation that devolution may have contributed to a fragmentation of policy communities. 
At the same time and somewhat in contrast, our regression results (see Table 3) also confirm 
that while Belgium can no longer be characterized as entirely pillarized, pillarized 
organizations have managed to maintain themselves quite well and still play a considerable 
role in supplying policy advice. The difference is enormous, namely an average expected 
probability of 0.64 for pillarized groups compared to 0.17 for the non-pillar organizations. 
Apparently, the legacy of a long-standing integration in one of the pillars and the close 
relationship with the traditional political parties still translates into a better integration in 
policy circles. 
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Conclusion 
 
With this article we aimed to contribute to the broader literature on the interaction between 
organized interests and policymakers by combining a bottom up registration of all mobilized 
groups with a mapping of all organizations that enjoy access to advisory bodies. In this way, 
we did not only analyze who enjoys access to policymakers, but also examined in what way 
these insiders differ from the full population of organized interests. In addition, by focusing 
on interest intermediation in Flanders, we were able to assess the impact of multilayeredness 
on patterns of interest representation. The results demonstrate that organized interests that 
represent a regional constituency, and that focus on fields that are the exclusive policy 
responsibility of the Flemish government, are much more likely to gain access. While we 
should be cautious due to a lack of robust longitudinal data, it appears that the successive state 
reforms had a significant impact on interest representation in Belgium as a considerable 
number of interest groups are organized at a subnational basis. While speculative, in the long 
run, this development may result in the further fragmentation of interest group communities in 
Belgium, and eventually lead to a shortage of organized interests that are able to bridge 
sectoral and territorial interests (see also Celis et al., 2013, p. 58).  
At the same time, however, our analyses show that the community of policy insiders in 
Flanders strongly reflects Belgium’s neo-corporatist and consociational legacy, as labor 
unions and other formerly pillarized associations still gain substantial access. This is 
somewhat remarkable, considering that neo-corporatist patterns are in decline in several 
countries (Oberg et al., 2011; Traxler, 2010), and taking into account the relatively young 
nature of the system of strategic advisory councils at the Flemish level, which was established 
in 2003 (Fobé et al., 2013). Yet, it cannot be concluded that policymakers are insensitive to 
the representative features of organized interests, as groups with stronger societal roots 
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(especially in terms of membership) stand a better chance of becoming insiders. Although 
professionalization and staff resources play an important part, the size of an organization’s 
constituency also is a critical factor.  
Finally, we should acknowledge some limitations of our research design. First, while 
we have population data for the Belgian case, as our insider data apply to one region, we 
could offer only a partial picture of interest representation in Belgium. While analyses of 
access of organized interests in other regions (such as Wallonia) might yield different results, 
we expect that in these cases, yet also in various other countries with an extensive “meso” 
level of governance (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Spain and 
Germany), the organization and representation of societal interests is substantially affected by 
multilayeredness (for instance Baumgartner et al., 2009; Constantelos, 2010; Keating and 
Wilson, 2014). Second, as we lack longitudinal data on interest group access, nor detailed and 
reliable evidence on the development of organizational features over time, the precise causal 
relationship between some factors - such as membership and staff resources – and government 
access remains unclear. One can imagine that policymakers prefer to interact with 
professionalized groups that credibly represent a sizable societal segment and are able to 
supply valuable expertise. Yet, being an insider might also benefit the overall organizational 
development of an interest group (Fraussen 2014; Fisker 2015). Future research that maps the 
organizational development of organized interests in conjunction with their degree of 
government access might deliver more clarity on this thought provoking matter.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 For instance, Belgium has three peak labor unions, each tied to specific political-ideological segments (in casu Catholics, 
socialists and liberals). In addition, also some prominent socio-cultural organizations (representing youth, women, elderly or 
disabled people) and NGOs can be linked to one of these pillars. 
2 NACE is the abbreviation of the French Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté 
européenne. This European industry classification system consists of a 6 digit code and is systematically used in most 
national statistical data-systems (see http://goo.gl/8NLquM). Full definition of S94: “This division includes activities of 
organizations representing interests of special groups or promoting ideas to the general public. These organizations usually 
have a constituency of members, but their activities may involve and benefit non-members as well. The primary breakdown of 
this division is determined by the purpose that these organizations serve, namely interests of employers, self-employed 
individuals and the scientific community (group 94.1), interests of employees (group 94.2) or promotion of religious, 
political, cultural, educational or recreational ideas and activities (group 94.9).” 
3 They are assigned code 84.302, which specifically refers to mutuals or “ziekenfondsen en zorgkassen”. 
4 True, whether or not an organized interest has gained access to consultation arrangements is one way to assess access. Yet, 
there are still significant and substantial differences in the ‘insiderness’ among those who gained this form of access. For a 
more detailed account of this matter we refer to Maloney et al. 1994, and, for the Belgian case a recent publication by 
Fraussen et al. 2014). 
5 In addition we also tested models with an interaction term for membership density (the number of members) and 
membership types (individual members, institutional members, and associations). This allows us to check whether the impact 
of membership densities (vis-à-vis access) is conditional on the type of members. In the online appendix (Table 2A; Model V 
and VI) we report evidence with the raw and transformed membership variables. These results demonstrate that there is no 
significant conditional effect. This implies furthermore that, although organizations with individual members have less 
chance to gain access (Model II), on average organizations with more members enjoy more access (Model III and IV). Or, 
having more members can be considered as advantageous to all organizations (regardless of the particular membership type, 
i.e. also organizations with individual members benefit from it).  
 
